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ABSTRACT
The goal of this paper is to compute optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules in a real business cycle
model augmented with sticky prices, a demand for money, taxation, and stochastic government
consumption. We consider simple policy rules whereby the nominal interest rate is set as a function
of output and inflation, and taxes are set as a function of total government liabilities. We require
policy to be implementable in the sense that it guarantees uniqueness of equilibrium. We do away
with a number of empirically unrealistic assumptions typically maintained in the related literature
that are used to justify the computation of welfare using linear methods. Instead, we implement a
second-order accurate solution to the model. Our main findings are: First, the size of the inflation
coefficient in the interest-rate rule plays a minor role for welfare. It matters only insofar as it affects
the determinacy of equilibrium. Second, optimal monetary policy features a muted response to
output. More importantly, interest rate rules that feature a positive response of the nominal interest
rate to output can lead to significant welfare losses. Third, the optimal fiscal policy is passive.














Recently, there has been an outburst of papers studying optimal monetary policy in economies
with nominal rigidities.1 Most of these studies are conducted in the context of highly stylized
theoretical and policy environments. For instance, in most of this body of work it is assumed
that the government has access to a subsidy to factor inputs ﬁnanced with lump-sum taxes
aimed at dismantling the ineﬃciency introduced by imperfect competition in product and
factor markets. This assumption is clearly empirically unrealistic. But more importantly it
undermines a potentially signiﬁcant role for monetary policy, namely, stabilization of costly
aggregate ﬂuctuations around a distorted steady-state equilibrium.
A second notable simpliﬁcation is the absence of capital accumulation. All the way
from the work of Keynes (1936) and Hicks (1939) to that of Kydland and Prescott (1982)
macroeconomic theories have emphasized investment dynamics as an important channel for
the transmission of aggregate disturbances. It is therefore natural to expect that investment
spending should play a role in shaping optimal monetary policy. Indeed it has been shown,
that for a given monetary regime the determinacy properties of a standard Neo-Keynesian
model can change dramatically when the assumption of capital accumulation is added to the
model (Dupor, 2001).
A third important dimension along which the existing studies abstracts from reality is
the assumed ﬁscal regime. It is standard practice in this literature to completely ignore
ﬁscal policy. Implicitly, these models assume that the ﬁscal budget is balanced at all times
by means of lump-sum taxation. In other words, ﬁscal policy is always assumed to be non-
distorting and passive in the sense of Leeper (1991). However, empirical studies, such as
Favero and Monacelli (2003), show that characterizing postwar U.S. ﬁscal policy as passive
at all times is at odds with the facts. In addition, it is well known theoretically that,
given monetary policy, the determinacy properties of the rational expectations equilibrium
crucially depend on the nature of ﬁscal policy (e.g., Leeper, 1991). It follows that the design
of optimal monetary policy should depend upon the underlying ﬁscal regime in a nontrivial
fashion.
Fourth, model-based analyses of optimal monetary policy is typically restricted to economies
in which long-run inﬂation is nil or there is some form of wide-spread indexation. As a re-
sult, in the standard environments studied in the literature nominal rigidities have no real
consequences for economic activity and thus welfare in the long-run. It follows that the
assumptions of zero long-run inﬂation or indexation should not be expected to be inconse-
1See Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999), Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999), Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2002),
Benigno and Benigno (2002), and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2001, 2003) among many others.
1quential for the form that optimal monetary policy takes. Because from an empirical point
of view, neither of these two assumptions is particularly compelling for economies like the
United States, it is of interest to investigate the characteristics of optimal policy in their
absence.
Last but not least, more often than not studies of optimal policy in models with nominal
rigidities are conducted in cashless environments.2 This assumption introduces an inﬂation-
stabilization bias into optimal monetary policy. For the presence of a demand for money
creates a motive to stabilize the nominal interest rate rather than inﬂation.
Taken together the simplifying assumptions discussed above imply that business cycles
are centered around an eﬃcient non-distorted equilibrium. The main reason why these rather
unrealistic features have been so widely adopted is not that they are the most empirically
obvious ones to make nor that researchers believe that they are inconsequential for the nature
of optimal monetary policy. Rather, the motivation is purely technical. Namely, the stylized
models considered in the literature make it possible for a ﬁrst-order approximation to the
equilibrium conditions to be suﬃcient to accurately approximate welfare up to second order
(Woodford 2003, chapter 6).3 Any plausible departure from the set of simplifying assump-
tions mentioned above, with the exception of the assumption of no investment dynamics,
would require approximating the equilibrium conditions to second order.
Recent advances in computational economics have delivered algorithms that make it fea-
sible and simple to compute higher-order approximations to the equilibrium conditions of
a general class of large stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models.4 In this paper, we
employ these new tools to analyze a model that relaxes all of the questionable assumptions
mentioned above. The central focus of this paper is to investigate whether the policy conclu-
sions arrived at by the existing literature regarding the optimal conduct of monetary policy
are robust with respect to more realistic speciﬁcations of the economic environment. That is,
we study optimal policy in a world where there are no subsidies to undo the distortions cre-
ated by imperfect competition, where there is capital accumulation, where the government
may follow active ﬁscal policy and may not have access to lump-sum taxation, where nom-
2Exceptions are Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004).
3We note that an accurate ﬁrst-order approximation to the utility function around the non-stochastic
steady state can be obtained using a linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions. But such an
approximation is of little use. For the ﬁrst-order approximation of the unconditional expectation of the
welfare function around the non-stochastic steady state equals the welfare function evaluated at the non-
stochastic steady state. Similarly, the ﬁrst-order approximation of the conditional expectation of the welfare
function, given that the initial state is equal to the non-stochastic steady state, is the welfare function
evaluated at the non-stochastic steady state. It follows that if the initial state of the economy is the non-
stochastic steady state, then up to ﬁrst-order all policies that preserve the non-stochastic steady state yield
the same level of welfare.
4See, for instance, Sims (2000) and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004).
2inal rigidities induce ineﬃciencies even in the long run, and where there is a nonnegligible
demand for money.
Speciﬁcally, this paper characterizes monetary and ﬁscal policy rules that are optimal
within a family of implementable, simple rules in a calibrated model of the business cycle.
In the model economy, business cycles are driven by stochastic variations in the level of total
factor productivity and government consumption. The implementability condition requires
policies to deliver uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium. Simplicity requires
restricting attention to rules whereby policy variables are set as a function of a small number
of easily observable macroeconomic indicators. Speciﬁcally, we study interest-rate feedback
rules that respond to measures of inﬂation and output. We study six diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of those rules: backward-looking rules (where the interest rate responds to past inﬂation
and output), contemporaneous rules (where the interest rate responds to current inﬂation
and output), and forward-looking rules (where the interest rate responds to expected future
inﬂation and output). For each of these three types of rule, we consider the cases of interest-
rate smoothing (i.e., the past value of the interest rate enters as an additional argument into
the rule) and no interest-rate smoothing. We analyze ﬁscal policy rules whereby the tax
revenue is set as an increasing function of the level of public liabilities.
Our main ﬁndings are: First, the precise degree to which the central bank responds to
inﬂation in setting the nominal interest rate (i.e., the size of the inﬂation coeﬃcient in the
interest-rate rule) plays a minor role for welfare provided that the monetary/ﬁscal regime
renders the equilibrium unique. For instance, in all of the many environments we consider,
deviating from the optimal policy rule by setting the inﬂation coeﬃcient in the interest-
rate rule anywhere above unity and below -2 yields virtually the same level of welfare as
the optimal rule. At the same time values of the inﬂation coeﬃcient between -2 and 1 are
associated either with no equilibrium of indeterminacy of equilibrium. Thus, the fact that
optimal policy features an active monetary stance serves mainly the purpose of ensuring
the uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium. Second, optimal monetary policy
features a muted response to output. More importantly, not responding to output is critical
from a welfare point of view. In eﬀect, our results show that interest rate rules that feature a
positive response of the nominal interest rate to output can lead to signiﬁcant welfare losses.
Third, the optimal ﬁscal policy is passive. However, the welfare losses associated with the
adoption of an active ﬁscal stance are negligible.
Kollmann (2003) also considers welfare maximizing ﬁscal and monetary rules in a sticky
price model with capital accumulation. He also ﬁnds that optimal monetary features a
strong anti-inﬂation stance. However, the focus of his paper diﬀers from ours in a number
of dimensions. First, Kollmann does not consider the size of the welfare losses that are
3associated with non-optimal rules, which is at center stage in our work. Second, in his paper
the interest rate feedback rule is not allowed to depend on a measure of aggregate activity and
as a consequences the paper does not identify the importance of not responding to output.
Third, Kollmann limits attention to a cashless economy with zero long run inﬂation.
The remainder of the paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 presents the calibration of the model and discusses computational issues. Section 4
computes optimal policy in a cashless economy. Section 5 analyzes optimal policy in a
monetary economy. Section 6 introduces ﬁscal instruments as part of the optimal policy
design problem. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
The starting point for our investigation into the welfare consequences of alternative policy
rules is an economic environment featuring a blend of neoclassical and neo-Keynesian ele-
ments. Speciﬁcally, the skeleton of the economy is a standard real-business-cycle model with
capital accumulation and endogenous labor supply driven by technology and government
spending shocks. Four sources of ineﬃciency separate our model from the standard RBC
framework: (a) nominal rigidities in the form of sluggish price adjustment. A later section
incorporates sticky wages as a second source of nominal rigidity. (b) A demand for money
motivated by a working-capital constraint on labor costs. (c) time-varying distortionary
taxation. And (d) monopolistic competition in product markets. These four elements of the
model provide a rationale for the conduct of monetary and ﬁscal stabilization policy.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical households. Each household has







where Et denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on information avail-
able at time t, β ∈ (0,1) represents a subjective discount factor, and U is a period utility
index assumed to be strictly increasing in its ﬁrst argument, strictly decreasing in its second
argument, and strictly concave. The consumption good is assumed to be a composite good








where the parameter η>1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across dif-
ferent varieties of consumption goods. For any given level of consumption of the composite
good, purchases of each variety i in period t must solve the dual problem of minimizing
total expenditure,
R 1
0 Pitcitdi, subject to the aggregation constraint (2), where Pit denotes

















This price index has the property that the minimum cost of a bundle of intermediate goods
yielding ct units of the composite good is given by Ptct.
Households are assumed to have access to a complete set of nominal contingent claims.
Their period-by-period budget constraint is given by
Etrt,t+1xt+1 + ct + it + τ
L
t = xt +( 1− τ
D
t )[wtht + utkt]+˜ φt, (5)
where rt,s is a stochastic discount factor, deﬁned so that Etrt,sxs is the nominal value in
period t of a random nominal payment xs in period s ≥ t. The variable kt denotes capital,
it denotes investment, ˜ φt denotes proﬁts received from the ownership of ﬁrms net of income
taxes, τD
t denotes the income tax rate, and τL
t denotes lump-sum taxes. The capital stock
is assumed to depreciate at the constant rate δ, so the evolution of capital is given by
kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt + it. (6)
The investment good is assumed to be a composite good made with the aggregator func-
tion (2). Thus, the demand for each intermediate good i ∈ [0,1] for investment purposes,
denoted iit, is given by iit =( Pit/Pt)
−η it. Households are also assumed to be subject to a
borrowing limit that prevents them from engaging in Ponzi schemes. The household’s prob-
lem consists in maximizing the utility function (1) subject to (5), (6), and the no-Ponzi-game





















It is apparent from these ﬁrst-order conditions that the income tax distorts both the leisure-
labor choice and the decision to accumulate capital over time.
Let Rt denote the gross one-period, risk-free, nominal interest in period t. Then by a
no-arbitrage condition, Rt must equal the inverse of the period-t price of a portfolio that












The consolidated government prints money, Mt, issues one-period nominally risk-free bonds,
Bt, collects taxes in the amount of Ptτt, and faces an exogenous expenditure stream, gt. Its
period-by-period budget constraint is given by
Mt + Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 + Ptgt − Ptτt.w
The variable gt denotes per capita government spending on a composite good produced via
the aggregator (2). We assume, maybe unrealistically, that the government minimizes the
cost of producing gt. Thus, we have that the public demand for each type i of intermediate
goods, git, is given by git =( Pit/Pt)
−η gt. Let `t−1 ≡ (Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt−1)/Pt−1 denote total
real government liabilities outstanding at the beginning of period t in units of period t − 1
goods. Also, let mt ≡ Mt/Pt denote real money balances in circulation and πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1
denote the gross consumer price inﬂation. Then the government budget constraint can be
6written as
`t =( Rt/πt)`t−1 + Rt(gt − τt) − mt(Rt − 1) (11)
We wish to consider various alternative ﬁscal policy speciﬁcations that involve possibly
both lump sum and distortionary income taxation. Total tax revenue, τt, consist of revenue
from lump-sum taxation, τL
t , and revenue from income taxation, τD






The ﬁscal regime is deﬁned by the following rule











where γ0, γ1, γ2, and ` are parameters. According to this rule, the ﬁscal authority sets total
tax receipts as a function of two variables, the deviation of total government liabilities `t−1









We consider four diﬀerent ﬁscal policy regimes. In the ﬁrst two regimes all taxes are lump
sum at all times, and in the latter two all taxes are distortionary at all times. For each case,
lump-sum or distortionary taxation, we consider two diﬀerent feedback rules. One feedback
rule postulates that each period tax receipts are adjusted in response to variations in the
secondary ﬁscal deﬁcit in such a way that the secondary deﬁcit is zero. We refer to this rule
as a balanced-budget rule. Under the second policy total tax collection is set as a linear
function of the deviation of the stock of government liabilities from their target value. We
refer to this policy as liability targeting. The parameterizations associated with the four
cases then are:
(i) lump-sum taxes and balanced-budget rule: τD
t = γ0 = γ1 = 0 and γ2 =1
(ii) lump-sum taxes and liability targeting: τD
t =0 ,γ2 =0 ;
(iii) income taxation and balanced-budget rule: τL
t = γ0 = γ1 = 0 and γ2 =1 ;
(iv) income taxation and liability targeting: τL
t = 0 and γ2 =0 .
The a ﬁscal policy consisting of lump-sum taxation and a balanced-budget rule a is Ricardian
policy in the sense that ﬁscal variables play no role for price level determination.5 The ﬁscal
policy featuring lump-sum taxes and liability targeting is motivated by the one considered
in Leeper (1991). As Leeper shows depending on the size of the coeﬃcient γ1, this ﬁscal
5As shown in Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000), this claim is correct only if the nominal interest rate is
expected to be strictly positive in the long-run, which is an assumption we will maintain throughout the
paper.
7policy regime is active or passive. In particular for γ1 greater than but close to the real
rate of interest, ﬁscal policy will be passive, or Ricardian. We consider liability targeting
because it allows for the possibility that ﬁscal policy is active, or in the terminology of
Leeper (1991) active. In that case ﬁscal considerations will play an important role for price
level determination. This feature distinguishes our analysis from most of the existing related
literature where it is assumed from the outset (either explicitly or implicitly) that ﬁscal policy
is passive. It then follows that optimal monetary policy must be active by construction
because otherwise a determinate equilibrium usually does not exist. Our analysis is thus
broader because it allows for the possibility that a combination of active ﬁscal and passive
monetary policy is optimal.
We assume that the monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate accord-




∗)+αyEt ln(yt−i/y); i = −1,0,1, (14)
where Rt denotes the gross one-period nominal interest rate, yt denotes output in period t,
y denotes the non-stochastic steady-state level of output, and R∗, π∗, αR, απ,, and αy are
parameters. The index i can take three values 1, 0, and -1. In the case that i = 1, we refer
to the interest rate rule as backward looking, when i = 0 we call the rule contemporaneous,
and when i = −1 the rule is said to be forward looking. The reason why we focus on interest
rate feedback rules belonging to this class is that they are easily implementable. For all of
its arguments are generally available macroeconomic indicators.
We note that the type of monetary policy rules that are typically analyzed in the related
literature require no less information on the part of the policymaker than the feedback rule
given in equation (14). This is because the rules most commonly studied feature an output
gap measure deﬁned as deviations of output from the level that would obtain in the absence
of nominal rigidities. Computing the ﬂexible-price level of aggregate activity requires the
policymaker to know not just the deterministic steady state of the economy, but also the
joint distribution of all the shocks driving the economy and the current realizations of such
shocks.
2.3 Firms
Each good’s variety i ∈ [0,1] is produced by a single ﬁrm in a monopolistically competitive
environment. Each ﬁrm i produces output using as factor inputs capital services, kit, and
8labor services, hit. The production technology is given by
ztF(kit,h it),
where the function F is assumed to be homogenous of degree one, concave, and strictly
increasing in both arguments. The variable zt denotes an exogenous and stochastic produc-
tivity shock.
It follows from our analysis of private and public absorption behavior that the aggregate
demand for good i, ait ≡ cit + iit + git is given by
ait =( Pit/Pt)
−ηat,
where at ≡ ct + it + gt denotes aggregate absorption.
We introduce money in the model by assuming that wage payments are subject to a
cash-in-advance constraint of the form
mit ≥ νwthit, (15)
where mit denotes the demand for real money balances by ﬁrm i in period t and ν ≥ 0i sa
parameter denoting the fraction of the wage bill that must be backed with monetary assets.




ait − utkit − wthit − (1 − R
−1
t )mit. (16)
Implicit in this speciﬁcation of proﬁts is the assumption that ﬁrms rent capital services from
a centralized market, which requires that this factor of production can be readily reallocated
across industries. This is a common assumption in the related literature (e.g., Christiano
et al., 2003; Kollmann, 2003; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2003; and Rotemberg and Woodford,
1992). A polar assumption is that capital is sector speciﬁc, as in Woodford (2003) and Sveen
and Weinke (2003). Both assumptions are clearly extreme. A more realistic treatment of
investment dynamics would incorporate a mix of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and homogeneous capital.







The objective of the ﬁrm is to choose contingent plans for Pit, hit, kit and mit so as to
6Appendix A derives this expression.





Throughout our analysis, we will focus on equilibria featuring a strictly positive nominal
interest rate. This implies that the cash-in-advance constraint (15) will always be binding.
Then, letting mcit be the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (17), the ﬁrst-order










Notice that because all ﬁrms face the same factor prices and because they all have access
to the same homogenous-of-degree-one production technology, the capital-labor ratio, kit/hit
and marginal cost, mcit, are identical across ﬁrms.
Prices are assumed to be sticky ` a la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Speciﬁcally, each
period a fraction α ∈ [0,1) of randomly picked ﬁrms is not allowed to change the nominal
price of the good it produces. The remaining (1−α) ﬁrms choose prices optimally. Suppose
ﬁrm i gets to choose the price in period t, and let ˜ Pit denote the chosen price. This is set so

















































According to this expression, ﬁrms whose price is free to adjust in the current period, pick
a price level such that some weighted average of current and future expected diﬀerences
between marginal costs and marginal revenue equals zero.
102.4 Equilibrium and Aggregation
We limit attention to a symmetric equilibrium in which all ﬁrms that get to change their
price in each period indeed choose the same price. We thus drop the subscript i. So the










Similarly, the sum of all ﬁrm-level cash-in-advance constraints holding with equality yields
the following aggregate relationship between real balances and the wage bill:
mt = νwtht. (21)





t−1 +( 1− α) ˜ P
1−η
t
Dividing this expression through by P
1−η
t , one obtains
1=απ
−1+η
t +( 1− α)˜ p
1−η
t , (22)
where ˜ pt denotes the relative price of any good whose price was adjusted in period t in terms
of the composite good.
At this point, most of the related literature using the Calvo-Yun apparatus, proceeds to
linearize equations (18) and (22) around a deterministic steady state featuring zero inﬂa-
tion. This strategy yields the famous simple (linear) neo-Keynesian Phillips curve involving
inﬂation and marginal costs (or the output gap). In the present study one cannot follow
this strategy for two reasons. First, we do not wish to restrict attention to the case of
zero long-run inﬂation. For we believe it is unrealistic, as it is contradicted by the post-
war economic history of most industrialized countries. Second, we refrain from making the
set of highly special assumptions that allow welfare to be approximated accurately from a
ﬁrst-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions. One of these assumptions is the ex-
istence of factor-input subsidies ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes aimed at ensuring the perfectly
competitive level of long-run employment. Another assumption that makes it appropriate
to use ﬁrst-order approximations to the equilibrium conditions for welfare evaluation is that
11of a cashless economy. In the model under study we introduce a demand for money and
calibrate its size to US postwar experience.
Our approach makes it necessary to retain the non-linear nature of the equilibrium con-
ditions and in particular of equation (18). It is convenient to rewrite this expression in a











































































































Using the two auxiliary variables x1
t and x2









Naturally, the set of equilibrium conditions includes a resource constraint. Such a re-
striction is typically of the type ztF(kt,h t)=ct+it+gt. In the present model, however, this
restriction is not valid. This is because the model implies relative price dispersion across
varieties. This price dispersion, which is induced by the assumed nature of price stickiness, is
ineﬃcient and entails output loss. To see this, start with equilibrium condition (17) stating
12that supply must equal demand at the ﬁrm level:






Integrating over all ﬁrms and taking into account that the capital-labor ratio is common

















0 hitdi and kt ≡
R 1
0 kitdi denote the aggregate per capita levels of labor and





















































yt = ct + it + gt (27)





with s−1 given. The state variable st summarizes the resource costs induced by the ineﬃcient
price dispersion present in the Calvo-Yun model in equilibrium.
Three observations are in order about the dispersion measure st. First, st is bounded
below by 1. That is, price dispersion is always a costly distortion in this model. Second, in
an economy where the non-stochastic level of inﬂation is nil, i.e., when π = 1, up to ﬁrst
order the variable st is deterministic and follows a univariate autoregressive process of the
form ˆ st = αˆ st−1. Thus, the underlying price dispersion, summarized by the variable st, has
no real consequences up to ﬁrst order in the stationary distribution of endogenous variables.
This means that studies that restrict attention to linear approximations to the equilibrium
13conditions around a noninﬂationary steady-state are justiﬁed to ignore the variable st. But
this variable must be taken into account if one is interested in higher-order approximations
to the equilibrium conditions or if one focuses on economies without long-run price stability
(π∗ 6= 1). Omitting st in higher-order expansions would amount to leaving out certain
higher-order terms while including others. Finally, when prices are fully ﬂexible, α =0 ,w e
have that ˜ pt = 1 and thus st = 1. (Obviously, in a ﬂexible-price equilibrium there is no price
dispersion across varieties.).7
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a set of processes ct, ht, λt, wt, τD
t , ut, mct,
kt+1, Rt, it, yt, st,˜ pt, πt, τt, τL
t , `t, mt, x1
t, and x2
t for t =0 ,1,... that remain bounded
in some neighborhood around the deterministic steady-state and satisfy equations (6)-(14),
(19)-(28) and either τL
t = 0 (in the absence of lump-sum taxation) or τD
t = 0 (in the absence
of distortionary taxation), given initial values for k0, s−1, and `−1, and exogenous stochastic
processes gt and zt.
3 Computation, Calibration, and Welfare Measure
We wish to ﬁnd the monetary and ﬁscal policy rule combination that is optimal and im-
plementable within the simple family deﬁned by equations (13) and (14). For a policy to
be implementable, we require that it ensure local uniqueness of the rational expectations
equilibrium. In turn, for an implementable policy to be optimal, the contingent plans for
consumption and hours of work associated with that policy must yield the highest level of
lifetime utility, within the particular class of policy rules considered, given the current state






given that at time t all state variables take their steady-state values. That is to say, these
policies are optimal conditional on the current state being the steady state.
3.1 Computation
Given the complexity of the economic environment we study in this paper, we are forced to
characterize an approximation to lifetime utility. Up to ﬁrst-order accuracy, Vt is equal to
7Here we add a further note on aggregation. The variable ˜ φt introduced in the household’s budget
constraint (5) is related to aggregate proﬁts, φt ≡
R 1





This relationship states that working-capital expenditures are not tax deductible. We introduce this twist
in the tax code so that the base for distortionary taxation is simply value added, or aggregate demand, yt.
14its non-stochastic steady-state value. Because all the monetary and ﬁscal policy regimes we
consider imply identical non-stochastic steady states, to a ﬁrst-order approximation all of
those policies yield the same level of welfare. To determine the higher-order welfare eﬀects
of alternative policies one must therefore approximate Vt to a higher order than one. For an
expansion of Vt to be accurate up to second order, it is in general required that the solution
to the equilibrium conditions—the policy functions—also be accurate up to second order.
In particular, approximations to the policy functions based on a ﬁrst-order expansion of the
equilibrium conditions would result in general in an incorrect second-order approximation of
the welfare criterion Vt. In this paper, we compute second-order accurate solutions to policy
functions using the methodology and computer code of Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2004).
In characterizing optimal policy we search over the coeﬃcients αR, απ, and αy of the
monetary policy rule (14) and, when we consider ﬁscal policies other than balanced-budget
rules, over the coeﬃcient γ1 of the ﬁscal policy rule (13).
3.2 Calibration
We compute a second-order approximation to the policy functions around the non-stochastic
steady state of the model. The coeﬃcients of the approximated policy functions are them-
selves functions of the deep structural parameters of the model. Therefore, one must assign
numerical values to these structural parameters.
The time unit is meant to be a quarter. We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy.
We assume that the period utility function is given by
U(c,h)=
[c(1 − h)γ]1−σ − 1
1 − σ
. (29)
We set σ = 2, so that the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, holding constant hours
worked, is 0.5. In the business-cycle literature, authors have used values of 1/σ as low as
1/3 (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992) and as high as 1 (e.g., King, Plosser, and Rebelo,
1988). Our choice of σ falls in the middle of this range.




where θ describes the cost share of capital. We set θ equal to 0.3, which is consistent with
the empirical regularity that in the U.S. economy wages represent about 70 percent of total
cost.
We assign a value of 0.9902 to the subjective discount factor β, which is consistent with
15an annual real rate of interest of 4 percent (Prescott, 1986). We set η, the price elasticity
of demand, so that in steady state the value added markup of prices over marginal cost is
28 percent (see Basu and Fernald, 1997). We require the share of government purchases in
value added to be 17 percent in steady state, which is in line with the observed U.S. postwar
average. The steady-state inﬂation rate is assumed to be 4.2 percent per year. This value is
consistent with the average U.S. GDP deﬂator growth rate over the period 1960-1998. The
annual depreciation rate is taken to be 10 percent, a value typically used in business-cycle
studies.
Based on the observations that two thirds of M1 are held by ﬁrms (Mulligan, 1997) and
that annual GDP velocity is 0.17 in U.S. data (for a 1960 to 1999 sample), we calibrate the
ratio of working capital to quarterly GDP to 0.45(= 0.17× 2/3× 4). This parameterization
implies that ν =0 .82, which means that ﬁrm’s must pay 82 percent of their wage bill with
cash.
We set the ratio of tax revenues to GDP to 0.2, which is consistent with the 1997-2001
average of the US federal budget receipts to GDP ratio.8
Following Sbordone (2002) and Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999), we assign a value to α, the
fraction of ﬁrms that cannot change their price in any given quarter, that implies that on
average ﬁrms change prices every 3 quarters. We set the preference parameter γ so that
in the simple economy without money and lump-sum taxes, agents allocate on average 20
percent of their time to work, as is the case in the U.S. economy according to Prescott (1986).
Given the other calibrated parameters and the steady-state conditions, the implied value of
γ is 3.4080. The associated Frisch elasticity of labor supply then is about 1.5, which lies well
within the range of values typically used in the real business cycle literature.
We equate the parameters R∗, π∗, and y appearing in the monetary policy rule (14) to
the steady-state values of R, π, and y, respectively.
Government purchases are assumed to follow a univariate autoregressive process of the
form
ˆ gt = ρgˆ gt−1 + ￿
g
t,
where ˆ gt ≡ [lngt − lnG] denotes the percentage deviation of government purchases from
steady state and G denotes the steady-state level of government purchases. The ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation, ρg, is set to 0.9 and the standard deviation of ￿
g
t to 0.0074. The second
source of uncertainty in the model are productivity shocks. They are also assumed to follow
8Together with the assumed value for the share of government purchases in value added, the value assigned
to the tax-to-GDP ratio implies a long-run debt-to-GDP ratio of about 90 percent. This value is high relative
to the US out-of-war experience, but closer to what is observed in other G7 countries. A lower steady-state
debt-to-GDP ratio could be accommodated by allowing for government transfers.
16Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
1/σ 1
2 Intertemporal elasticity of consumption, U(c, h)=
[c(1−h)γ]1−σ−1
1−σ
θ 0.3 Cost Share of capital, F(k,h)=kθh1−θ
β 1.04−1/4 Quarterly subjective discount rate
η 5 Price elasticity of demand
sg 0.17 Steady-state share of government purchases,
g
y
π∗ 1.042(1/4) Gross quarterly inﬂation rate
δ 1.1(1/4) − 1 Quarterly depreciation rate
sm 0.17 × 2
3 × 4 Ratio of M1 held by ﬁrms to quarterly GDP
α
2
3 Share of ﬁrms that can change their price each period
γ 3.4080 Preference Parameter
sτ 0.2 Steady-state tax revenue to GDP ratio
ρg 0.9 ﬁrst-order serial correlation of gt
σ￿g 0.0074 Standard Deviation of government purchases shock
ρz 0.82 ﬁrst-order serial correlation of zt
σ￿z
0.0056 Standard Deviation of technology shock
a univariate autoregressive process
lnzt = ρz lnzt−1 + ￿
z
t,
where ρz =0 .82 and the standard deviation of ￿z
t is 0.0056. Table 1 summarizes the calibra-
tion of the model.
3.3 The Welfare Measure
We measure the level of utility associated with a particular monetary and ﬁscal policy spec-
iﬁcation as follows. Let the contingent plans for consumption and hours associated with a
particular monetary and ﬁscal regime be denoted by cr
t and hr
t. Then we measure welfare as
the conditional expectation of lifetime utility as of time zero, that is,









In addition, we assume that at time zero all state variables of the economy equal their
respective steady-state values. Note that we are departing from the usual practice of iden-
tifying the welfare measure with the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility. Because
diﬀerent policy regimes will in general be associated with a diﬀerent stochastic steady state,
using unconditional expectations of welfare amounts to not taking into account the transi-
17tional dynamics leading to the stochastic steady state. Because the non-stochastic steady
state is the same across all policy regimes we consider, our choice of computing expected
welfare conditional on the initial state being the nonstochastic steady state ensures that
the economy begins from the same initial point under all possible polices. Therefore, our
strategy will deliver the constrained optimal monetary/ﬁscal rule associated with a particu-
lar initial state of the economy. It is of interest to investigate the robustness of our results
with respect to alternative initial conditions. For, in principle, the welfare ranking of the
alternative polices will depend upon the assumed value for (or distribution of) the initial
state vector.9
We compute the welfare cost of a particular monetary and ﬁscal regime relative to the
optimized rule as follows. Consider two policy regimes, a reference policy regime denoted
by r and an alternative policy regime denoted by a. Then we deﬁne the welfare associated














t denote the contingent plans for consumption and hours under policy regime












Let λ denote the welfare cost of adopting policy regime a instead of the reference policy
regime r. We measure λ as the fraction of regime r’s consumption process that a household
would be willing to give up to be as well oﬀ under regime a as under regime r. Formally, λ












For the particular functional form for the period utility function given in equation (29), the
















(1 − λ)1−σ − 1
(1 − σ)(1 − β)
.
Solving for λ we obtain the following expression for the welfare cost associated with policy
9For further discussion of this issue, see Kim et al., 2003.
18regime a vis-´ a-vis the reference policy regime r in percentage terms




(1 − σ)V a
0 +( 1− β)−1
(1 − σ)V r
0 +( 1− β)−1
￿1/(1−σ)#
× 100. (30)
4 A Cashless Economy
We ﬁrst consider a non-monetary economy by setting
ν =0
in equation (15). The ﬁscal authority is assumed to have access to lump-sum taxes and to
follow a balanced-budget rule. That is, the ﬁscal policy rule is given by equations (12) and
(13) with





This case is of interest for it most resembles the case studied in the related literature
on optimal policy (see Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler, 1999, Woodford, 2003, chapter 4, and
the references cited therein). This body of work studies optimal monetary policy in the
context of a cashless economy with nominal rigidities and no ﬁscal authority. For analytical
purposes, the absence of a ﬁscal authority is equivalent to modeling a government that
operates under a perpetual balanced-budget rule and collects all of its revenue via lump-sum
taxation. We wish to highlight, however, two important diﬀerences between the economy
studied here and the one typically considered in the related literature. Namely, in our
economy there is capital accumulation and there do not exist subsidies to factor inputs
that undo the distortions arising from monopolistic competition. The latter diﬀerence is of
consequence for the solution method that can be applied to the optimal policy problem. As
shown by Woodford (2003, chapter 6), one can use a ﬁrst-order approximation to the policy
function to obtain an accurate second-order approximation to the utility function under
certain assumptions. One of the necessary assumptions is that the government has access
to factor input subsidies to undo the monopolistic distortion. Without this ad-hoc subsidy
scheme, ﬁrst-order approximations to the policy functions no longer deliver a second-order
accurate approximation to the utility function. Thus, in this case one must approximate the
policy functions up to second order to obtain a second-order accurate approximation to the
level of welfare, which is what we do in this paper.
19The top panel of table 2 presents the coeﬃcients of some optimized policy rules and
of some other monetary policy speciﬁcations. For this economy, we consider ﬁve diﬀerent
monetary policies. Two of those are constrained optimal rules. In one case, we search over
the monetary feedback rule coeﬃcients απ and αy while restricting αR to be zero. This
case is labeled no smoothing in the table. For each parameter we search over a grid from
-3 to 3 with a step of 0.1, that is, we consider 61 values for each parameter. For a policy
rule to be optimal, we require that (a) the associated equilibrium be locally unique; (b)
the equilibrium is locally unique everywhere in a neighborhood of radius 0.15 around the
optimized coeﬃcients; and (c) welfare attains a local optimum within that neighborhood.
Condition (a) rules out parameter speciﬁcations that render the equilibrium indeterminate.
Requirement (b) eliminates parameter conﬁgurations that are in the vicinity of a bifurcation
point. The reason for excluding such points is that welfare computations near a bifurcation
point may be inaccurate. Condition (c) rules out selecting an element of a sequence of policy
parameters associated with increasing welfare that converges to a bifurcation point. We ﬁnd
that the best no-smoothing rule requires that the monetary authority not respond to output
and choose an inﬂation coeﬃcient of 3. Note that this is the largest value of απ that we
allow in our search. Our conjecture is that if we left this parameter unconstrained, then
optimal policy would call for an arbitrarily large inﬂation coeﬃcient.10 The reason is that in
that case under the optimal policy inﬂation would in eﬀect be forever constant so that the
economy would be characterized by zero inﬂation volatility.
One might wonder why the representative household prefers to live in a world with con-
stant positive inﬂation rather than in one with varying inﬂation. This question is motivated
by the fact that the non-stochastic steady-state level of inﬂation in our model is positive,
which means that the distortions introduced by price stickiness are present even in the
steady state. Some intuition for why constant inﬂation is optimal when the long-run level
is constrained exogenously to be positive can be gained from the fact that in our model
the non-stochastic steady-state level of welfare is globally concave in the steady-state inﬂa-
tion rate with a maximum at zero inﬂation. Thus, loosely speaking households dislike to
randomize around the constant level of long-run inﬂation.
We next study a case in which the central bank can smooth interest rates over time,
formally, we allow the coeﬃcient αR on the lagged interest rate to take any value between
-3 and 3. Our grid search yields that the optimal policy coeﬃcients are απ =3 ,αy = 0, and
αR =0 .9. These coeﬃcients imply that the long-run coeﬃcient on inﬂation is 30, the largest
value it can take given our grid size. So, again, as in the case without smoothing optimal
10We experimented enlarging the απ range up to [−7,7]. We found that the optimal rule always picks the
highest value allowed for the inﬂation coeﬃcient.
20Table 2: Optimal Interest-Rate Rules in the Sticky-Price Model
Interest-Rate Rule ˆ Rt = απˆ πt + αyˆ yt + αR ˆ Rt−1
απ αy αR γ1 Welfare Welfare Cost
No Money, Lump-Sum Taxes, Balanced Budget (ν = τD
t = γ0 = γ1 =0 ;γ2 =1 )
No smoothing 3 0 – – -628.2193 0.0002
Smoothing 3 0 0.9 – -628.2180 0
Inﬂation Targeting (ˆ πt = 0) – – – – -628.2175 -0.00007
Taylor Rule 1.5 0.5 – – -634.1565 0.8061
Simple Taylor Rule 1.5 0 – – -628.2383 0.0028
Money, Lump-Sum Taxes, Balanced Budget (ν =0 .82, τD
t = γ0 = γ1 =0 ,γ2 =1 )
No smoothing 3 0 – – -629.6905 0.0002
Smoothing 3 0 0.9 – -629.6892 0
Inﬂation Targeting (ˆ πt = 0) – – – – -629.6889 -0.00005
Taylor Rule 1.5 0.5 – – Too close to bifurcation
Simple Taylor Rule 1.5 0 – – -629.7077 0.0025
Fiscal Feedback Rule: τL
t =0 .2+γ1(`t−1 − `); (ν =0 .82, τD
t = γ2 =0 )
Optimized Rule 3 0 – 1.9∗ -629.6905 0
Inﬂation Targeting (ˆ πt =0 ) – – – 1 .9∗ -629.6889 -0.0002
Money Growth Rate Peg (Mt+1 = µMt) ––– 1 .9∗ -629.7319 0.0057
Simple Taylor Rule 1.5 0 – 1.9∗ -629.7077 0.0023
Distorting Taxes: τD
t yt = γ0 + γ1(`t−1 − `). (ν =0 .82, τL
t =0 ,γ2 =0 )
Optimized Rule -3 0.1 – -3 -710.7907 0
Taylor Rule 1.5 0.5 – Too close to bifurcation
Simple Taylor Rule 1.5 0 – 0.1 -710.7978 .0009
Inﬂation Targeting (ˆ πt = 0) – – – 0.1 -710.7558 -0.0043
Notes: (1) Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate, πt denotes the gross in-
ﬂation rate, and yt denotes output. (2) For any variable xt, its non-stochastic
steady-state value is denoted by x, and its log-deviation from steady state by ˆ xt ≡
ln(xt/x). (3) In all cases, the parameters απ, αy, and αR are restricted to lie in the
interval [−3,3]. (4) Welfare is deﬁned as follows: Let V (gt,z t,R t−1,` t−1,s t−1,k t)
denote the equilibrium level of lifetime utility of the representative household
in period t given that period’s state (gt,z t,R t−1,` t−1,s t−1,k t). Then welfare is
deﬁned as V (g,z,R,`,s,k). (5) The welfare cost is measured relative to opti-
mized rule and is deﬁned as the percentage decrease in the consumption process
associated with the optimal rule necessary to make the level of welfare under the
optimized rule identical to that under the considered policy. Thus, a positive
ﬁgure indicates that welfare is higher under the optimized rule than under the
alternative policy.
∗ In the economy with a ﬁscal feedback rule for lump-sum taxes, any passive ﬁscal
policy yields the identical level of welfare, that is, any γ1 ∈ [0.1,1.9] is optimal.
21Figure 1: Determinacy Regions and Welfare in the Cashless Economy














Note: A dot represents a parameter combination for which the equilibrium is
determinate. A circle denotes that the welfare cost of the policy relative to the
optimal policy (i.e. απ =3 ,αy = 0, and αR =0 .9) is less than 0.05 percent.
policy calls for a large response to inﬂation deviations in order to stabilize the inﬂation
rate and for no response to deviation of output from the steady state. The level of welfare
associated with this policy is -628.2180. This is slightly higher than -628.2193, the level of
welfare associated with the optimal policy without smoothing. But the diﬀerence is not very
large. As shown in column 7 of table 2, agents would be willing to give up just 0.0002, that
is, 2 one-thousands, of one percent of their consumption stream under the optimized rule
with smoothing to be as well oﬀ as under the optimized policy without smoothing. For all
practical purposes we regard this diﬀerence in the level of welfare as negligible.
This ﬁnding let us to investigate by how much welfare indeed changes as we vary the
coeﬃcients of the policy rule. Figure 1 shows that given that the central bank does not
22respond to output, αy = 0, varying απ and αR between the -3 and 3 typically leads to
welfare losses of less than ﬁve one-hundredth of one percent. The graph shows with a dot
the combinations of απ and αR that render the rational expectations equilibrium determinate
and with a circle the combinations for which the welfare costs are less than 0.05 percent.
The ﬁgure makes two important points. First, it shows that there are quite a large number
of απ and αR combinations for which the equilibrium fails to be locally unique (the blank
area in the ﬁgure). This is for example the case for positive values of απ and αR such that
the policy stance is passive in the long run, that is, for απ and αR combinations such that
0 <α π/(1−αR) < 1. This ﬁnding is consistent with those obtained in economic environments
that abstract from capital accumulation. It is thus reassuring that this particular abstraction
appears to be of no consequence for the ﬁnding that long-run passive policy is inconsistent
with local uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium. Similarly, with rules in which
the response to inﬂation and past interest rates is positive we ﬁnd that determinacy obtains
for policies that are active in the long run (απ/(1−αR) > 1). Second, and more importantly,
the graph shows that basically all parameterization of the monetary feedback rule that deliver
determinacy yield welfare diﬀerences in the order of at most ﬁve one-hundredth of one percent
of the consumption stream associated with the optimized rule. This implies a simple policy
prescription, namely, that any parameter combination that implies that the policy stance is
acyclical and active in the long run is equally desirable from a welfare point of view.
One possible reaction to the ﬁnding that determinacy-preserving variations in απ and
αR have little welfare consequences may be that in the class of model we consider welfare
is always very ﬂat in a rather large neighborhood around the optimum, so that it does not
really matter what the government does. However, this is not the case in our economy.
Recall that in the welfare calculations underlying ﬁgure 1 the response coeﬃcient on output,
αy, was kept constant at zero. Indeed, interest-rate policy rules that lean against the wind
by raising the nominal interest rate when output is above trend can be associated with large
welfare costs.
4.1 The importance of not responding to output
Figure 2 illustrates the consequences of introducing a cyclical component to the interest-rate
rule. It shows that the welfare costs of varying αy can be large, thereby underlining the
importance of not responding to output. The solid line shows the welfare cost of deviating
from the optimal output coeﬃcient (αy = 0) while keeping the remaining two coeﬃcients of
the interest-rate rule at their optimal values (απ = 3 and αR =0 .9). For positive values of
αy, the welfare cost of the suboptimal rule is monotonically increasing in αy. When αy =1 ,
23Figure 2: The Importance of Not Responding to Output: The Cashless Economy






































Note: The welfare cost is relative to the optimized policy rule, i.e., απ =3 ,
αy = 0, and αR =0 .9. See equation (30).
24the welfare cost is one-tenth of one percent of the consumption stream associated with the
optimized rule. For negative output response coeﬃcients, the welfare cost also rapidly rises.
For an αy of -0.5 the welfare cost is two tenth of one percent. For values below -0.5, the
equilibrium ceases to be locally unique and thus the solid line ends.
To highlight the importance of not responding to output, ﬁgure 2 also shows the welfare
consequences of varying either απ, shown with a circled line, or αR, shown with the dashed
line. Again, as the value of one parameter varies, the values assigned to the remaining two
parameters are held constant at their optimal levels. For both the inﬂation coeﬃcient απ
and the inertial coeﬃcient αR, the welfare costs of deviating from the optimal values are
negligible. Thus these ﬁndings suggest that bad policy can have huge welfare costs in our
model and that big policy mistakes are committed when policy makers are unable to resist
the temptation to respond to output ﬂuctuations. It follows that sound monetary policy
calls for sticking to the basics of responding to inﬂation alone.11
A question that emerges naturally from our forgoing results is why cyclical monetary
policy is so disruptive. An intuition often oﬀered for why a policy of leaning against the
wind is not appropriate in response to supply shocks such as a technology shock, is that
under leaning against the wind the nominal interest rate rises whenever output rises. This
increase in the nominal interest rate in turn hinders prices falling by as much as marginal
costs causing markups to increase. With an increase in markups, output does not increase
as much as it would have otherwise, preventing the eﬃcient rise in output (see, for example,
Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997). This explanation requires that in response to a positive
supply shock, the central bank raises the nominal interest by more or lowers it by less in
the case that αy is positive as compared to the case in which αy is nil. But this is not what
happens in the class of sticky-price models to which ours belongs.
Figure 3 depicts the impulse of a number of endogenous variables of interest to a one-
percent increase in the exogenous productivity factor zt. The ﬁgure displays impulse response
functions associated with two alternative values for the output coeﬃcient in the interest-rate
rule, the one called for by the optimized rule (αy = 0) and a positive one (αy =0 .5). In
response to the positive productivity shock, the nominal interest rate increases in the case of
an acyclical monetary stance, but falls when the central bank leans against the wind. This
implication of the model may appear as surprising at ﬁrst. For one would be inclined to
expect that introduction of a procyclical component into the interest rate rule would induce
a stronger positive response of the nominal interest rate to a positive supply shock. But
further inspection of the structure of the model reveals that the intuition is indeed more
11A number of other authors have argued that countercyclical interest rate policy may be undesirable (e.g.,
Ireland, 1996; and Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997).
25Figure 3: Impulse Response to a 1 percent technology shock
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Note: The feedback rule coeﬃcients are απ =3 ,αy = 0 or 0.5, and αR =0 .9. For
all variables with the exception of the inﬂation rate and the nominal interest rate,
the impulse responses are shown in percent deviations from the steady state. For
inﬂation and the nominal interest rate, deviations from steady state in percentage
points, rather than percent deviations, are shown.
26Table 3: Standard Deviations and Serial Correlations
Percent Std. Dev. Serial Corr.
αy =0 αy =0 .5 αy =0 αy =0 .5
Interest Rate 0.22 0.93 0.91 0.92
Inﬂation 0.03 1.08 -0.02 0.84
Output 1.69 1.52 0.85 0.84
Hours 0.75 0.44 0.75 0.90
Consumption 1.10 0.99 0.94 0.97
Government Purchases 1.69 1.69 0.90 0.90
Technology Shock 0.98 0.98 0.82 0.82
Note. The standard deviations of inﬂation and the nominal interest rate are
expressed in percentage points per year.
subtle. The dynamics of inﬂation in this model are driven primarily by the Fisher eﬀect
(i.e., the interest rate is the sum of expected future inﬂation and the real interest rate)
and the interest rate rule, linking the interest rate to current inﬂation and output. A simple
ﬂexible price example will suﬃce to gather intuition for the equilibrium dynamics of inﬂation.
Consider an endowment economy where output follows a univariate autoregressive process of
the form Etˆ yt+1 = ρˆ yt with ρ ∈ (0,1). All variables are expressed in log-deviations from their
respective deterministic-steady-state values. In equilibrium, the Euler equation that prices
riskless nominal bonds (or Fisher equation) is of the form −σˆ yt = ˆ Rt − Etˆ πt+1 − σEtˆ yt+1,
where σ measures the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The interest-rate rule is of
the form ˆ Rt = απˆ πt + αyˆ yt, with απ > 1. The non-explosive solution to this system of
stochastic linear diﬀerence equations is ˆ πt = Dπˆ yt where Dπ ≡ [σ(1 − ρ)+αy]/(ρ − απ) < 0
and ˆ Rt = DRˆ yt, where DR =[ απσ(1−ρ)+αyρ]/(ρ−απ) < 0. Note that as output becomes
highly persistent (ρ → 1), we have that both Dπ and DR converge to αy/(1 − απ). In this
case we have that a positive output innovation produces a negative response of inﬂation and
the interest rate when the Fed has a countercyclical stance (αy > 0), but has no eﬀect on the
equilibrium level of these variables when monetary policy is acyclical (αy = 0). Moreover,
the decline in inﬂation and interest rates are larger the greater is the output coeﬃcient of
the interest-rate feedback rule.
The argument in the previous paragraph suggests that cyclical monetary policy results
in higher inﬂation volatility. Table 3 conﬁrms this conjecture. It shows that in our sticky-
price model the standard deviation of inﬂation falls from 108 basis points per annum to 3
basis points as αy decreases from 0.5 to zero. In the context of nominal rigidities, inﬂation
volatility entails a welfare cost because it generates ineﬃcient price dispersion.
274.2 Inﬂation Targeting
Our forgoing suggest that a policy of complete inﬂation stabilization may be the optimal
policy prescription in our economy. Thus, we were led to compute the level of welfare
associated with inﬂation targeting. Under inﬂation targeting the central bank is assumed
to do something that results in a constant inﬂation rate over the business cycle. We do not
discuss how such a policy may actually be implemented. The level of welfare for this regime
is -628.2175, which is higher than the level of welfare associated with the optimized rule with
smoothing. But the welfare beneﬁt is only 0.00007, which means that one would have to
raise the consumption stream under the optimized rule by 0.00007 percent to make agents
as happy as they are under an inﬂation targeting regime.
Finally, we show the welfare costs associated with a Taylor rule featuring an inﬂation
coeﬃcient of 1.5 and an output coeﬃcient of either 0.5 or of 0. In the former case, the welfare
costs are large ( 0.8 percent) as expected from the analysis presented in ﬁgure 2 whereas in
the latter case the welfare costs are negligible as was already implicit in ﬁgure 1.
4.3 Backward- and Forward-Looking Interest-Rate Rules
An important issue in monetary policy is what measures of inﬂation and aggregate activity
the central bank should respond to. In particular, a question that has received considerable
attention among academic economists and policymakers is whether the monetary authority
should target past, current, or expected future values. Here we address this question by com-
puting optimal backward- and forward-looking interest-rate rules. That is, in equation (14)
we let i take the values −1 and +1. Table 4 presents the results. To facilitate comparison,
the table reproduces the optimal rule coeﬃcients for the case in which the central bank re-
sponds to measures of current inﬂation and output (i = 0) from table 2. The top panel of the
table shows that there are no welfare gains from targeting expected future values of inﬂation
and output as opposed to current or lagged values of these macroeconomic indicators. The
best speciﬁcation is one where the monetary authority responds to current values of the two
target variables. Not responding to output continues to be optimal under backward- and
forward-looking rules.
In the absence of smoothing (αR = 0) both backward- and forward-looking interest-rate
rules appear to be disruptive. In the case of a forward-looking rule, the rational expectations
equilibrium is indeterminate for all values of the inﬂation and output coeﬃcients in the inter-
val [-3,3]. This result is in line with those obtained by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003). These
authors consider an environment similar to ours and characterize determinacy of equilibrium
for interest-rate rules that depend only on the rate of inﬂation. Our indeterminacy result
28Table 4: Optimal Backward- and Forward-Looking Interest-Rate Rules
Interest-Rate Rule ˆ Rt = απˆ πt−i + αyˆ yt−i + αR ˆ Rt−1
απ αy αR Welfare Welfare Cost
Smoothing
Current Looking (i = 0) 3 0 0.9 -628.2180 0
Backward Looking (i = 1) 3 0 2.8 -628.2207 0.0004
Forward-Looking (i = −1) 3 0 -2.3 -628.8657 0.0886
No Smoothing
Current Looking (i = 0) 3 0 – -628.2193 0.0002
Backward Looking (i = 1) 3 -1.2 – -629.2988 0.1477
Forward-Looking (i = −1) The equilibrium is indeterminate
Notes: See notes to table 2.
for forward-looking rules thus extends the ﬁndings of Carlstrom and Fuerst to the case in
which output enters into the feedback rule.12
5 A Monetary Economy
We next introduce money into the model by assuming that the parameter ν denoting the
fraction of the wage bill that must be cash ﬁnanced takes the value shown on table 1. All
other aspects of the model, including the ﬁscal policy speciﬁcation, are as in the cashless
economy analyzed in the previous section. Unlike in the cashless economy, in this model
complete inﬂation stabilization may not continue to be optimal because it is associated with
ﬂuctuations in the nominal interest rate, which in turn now distort the eﬀective wage rate via
the working-capital constraint. So, there will be a trade oﬀ between inﬂation stabilization
to neutralize the distortions stemming from sluggish price adjustment and nominal interest
rate stabilization to dampen the distortions introduced by the working capital constraint.
This tradeoﬀ, however, does not seem to be quantitatively important. In eﬀect, when
we search over the coeﬃcients of the interest rate feedback rule, απ, αy, and αR, we recover
the same optimal coeﬃcient values as in the economy without money, that is, απ takes the
largest value included in our grid, 3, the output coeﬃcient is zero, αy = 0, and the central
bank makes intensive use of interest rate smoothing, αR =0 .9. The level of welfare under
the optimal rule is -629.6892.13 If we do not allow for interest rate smoothing, that is, if we
12Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) comment that including output in the interest rate rule would have minor
eﬀects on the local determinacy conditions (see their footnote 4).
13In this economy the deterministic steady-state level of welfare is -629.7040 compared to -628.2323 for
29constrain αR to be zero, it is still optimal not to respond to output, αy = 0 and to make the
inﬂation response of the interest rate as large as possible (απ = 3). Utility falls slightly to
-629.6905. The welfare cost of eliminating smoothing is just 0.0002 percent of consumption,
which is again economically negligible.
As in the cashless case, we ﬁnd that the precise magnitude of the inﬂation coeﬃcient and
the smoothing coeﬃcient play no rule, provided that they imply a locally unique rational
expectations equilibrium and αy is held at zero. This point is clearly communicated by
ﬁgure 4. As before, a dot in the ﬁgure indicates that this particular (suboptimal) combination
of απ and αR results in a determinate equilibrium and a circle indicates that the welfare cost
associated with it is less than 0.05 percent of the optimal consumption stream. Variations in
the output response coeﬃcient of the interest rate feedback rule, αy continue to be associated
with large welfare losses particularly if αy is large. Figure 5 plots with a solid line the welfare
losses as a function of αy. Equilibrium is locally unique only for values of αy between -0.3
and 2.4, given απ = 3 and αR =0 .9. The welfare costs exceed 0.05 percent for αy greater
than 0.6. Consider αy =0 .6. Then, given αR =0 .9 the long-run coeﬃcient on output is 6
and the welfare loss is only 0.0424 percent. On the other hand, for αy = 2, for example, the
welfare cost is 1.15 percent of consumption, which is a relatively large number. By contrast,
variations in αR and αy over the range [−3,3] lead to welfare costs of at most 0.0013 and
0.0004 percent, respectively.
A further similarity between the cashless and the cash-in-advance economies is that inﬂa-
tion targeting dominates all other policies considered. In sum, in this economy, the tradeoﬀ
between inﬂation stabilization and interest rate stabilization introduced by nominal rigidities
on the one hand and the monetary exchange friction on the other hand, is overwhelmingly
resolved in favor of inﬂation stabilization.
5.1 Diﬀerence Rules
In motivating the interest-rate rules considered above, we argue that they demand little
sophistication on the part of policymakers because the variables involved in the rules are few
and easily observable. However, one might argue that because the variables included in the
rules we have been working with are expressed in deviations from the non-stochastic steady
state, implementation requires knowledge of the deterministic steady state by the central
bank. The non-stochastic steady state is, however, non-observable. Thus, the assumed rule
the economy without money. Given our assumption that the nominal interest rate is positive in the non-
stochastic steady state welfare must be lower in the economy with money than in the one without money.
Both in the cashless economy and in the model with money, welfare under the optimized rule is higher
than in the non-stochastic steady state. The reason must be that the presence of monopolistic competition
induces higher output and consumption on average in a stochastic economy than in a non-stochastic one.
30Figure 4: Determinacy Regions and Welfare in the Monetary Economy














Note: See note to ﬁgure 1.
31Figure 5: The Importance of Not Responding to Output: The Monetary Economy


































Note: See note to ﬁgure 2.
32presumes a degree of knowledge that central bankers may not posses. A way to avoid this
problem is be to postulate a rule that includes time diﬀerences in prices, aggregate activity,




Note that besides the policy coeﬃcients απ and αy, the only parameter required for imple-
menting this rule is the inﬂation target π∗, which is a choice value for the central bank.
In this sense, this rule is simpler than the one studied earlier. We ﬁnd, however, that the
optimal rule within this class is similar in spirit to the optimal policy obtained before. In
eﬀect in both the cashless and the monetary economies, optimal policy calls for a strong
antiinﬂationary stance (απ = 3) and no response to output (αy = 0). Furthermore, the
optimal diﬀerence rule yields virtually the same level of welfare as that associated with the
optimal level rule under smoothing.
6 An Economy With A Fiscal Feedback Rule
Thus far, we have restricted attention to the case of a ﬁscal authority that takes a passive
stance in the sense that ﬁscal policy has no eﬀect on the price level and inﬂation. The
motivation for this treatment of ﬁscal policy is in part that this is what is typically assumed
in the related literature. But it is worthwhile to ask whether from a welfare point of view a
passive ﬁscal policy stance is desirable and moreover even if it turns out that optimal policy
calls for a passive ﬁscal stance, it is of interest to know how close one can get to the level of
welfare associated with the optimized monetary and ﬁscal rule in a world where ﬁscal policy
is active. For this reason, in this section, we study a simple ﬁscal policy rule that allows
for the possibility that ﬁscal policy is either active or passive. The rule has elements of the
ones studied in Leeper (1991) and in Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe (2001, 2002).
According to our ﬁscal rule, tax revenues are set as a linear function of total real government
liabilities. Formally, the ﬁscal rule is given by
τ
L
t = γ0 + γ1(`t−1 − `
∗).
Fiscal policy is deﬁned by equations (12) and (13) with τD
t = 0 for all t and γ2 = 0. Combin-
ing the above ﬁscal policy with the government sequential budget constraint, equation (11),
one obtains `t = Rt/πt(1 − πtγ1)`t−1 + rest. Loosely speaking, this expression states that
the feedback parameter γ1 controls the rate of growth of total real government liabilities. If
1 − γ1π∗ is less than one in absolute value, then real government liabilities grow at a rate
33less than the real rate of interest. In this case, ﬁscal solvency is guaranteed regardless of the
stance of monetary policy and ﬁscal concerns play no role for the determination of the price
level, that is, ﬁscal policy is passive. On the other hand, if 1 − γ1π∗ is greater than unity
in absolute value, then the size of government liabilities grows without bounds in absolute
value. In this case, existence of a stationary equilibrium requires that the initial price level
adjusts to a value that is consistent with a bounded path for government liabilities. This
would be an example of an active ﬁscal policy.
To save on computing time, in this section, we only consider interest rate feedback rules
that depend on the current value of inﬂation and output. That is, we restrict αR to be equal
to zero in equation (14).
The third panel of table 2 presents the numerical results. We ﬁnd that the optimal
monetary/ﬁscal rule combination features an active monetary policy and a passive ﬁscal
policy. The optimal coeﬃcients are απ =3 ,αy = 0, and any γ1 ∈ [0.1,1.9]. Under the
optimal policy, utility is equal to -629.6905, slightly above the steady state level of -629.7040.
Note that the level of utility under the optimized rule is the same as in the monetary economy
discussed in the previous section. This is because if ﬁscal policy is passive and taxation is
lump-sum—which is the case in the economies analyzed in this and the previous sections—
then the real allocation is the same regardless of the precise nature of the passive ﬁscal
policy. It follows that any feedback rule coeﬃcient γ1 such that ﬁscal policy is passive (i.e.,
values of γ1 satisfying |1−γ1π∗| < 1, or, under our calibration (and grid size), 0 <γ 1 < 1.9)
implement, ceteris paribus, the same real allocation as the balanced-budget rule analyzed in
the previous section.
The intuition for why the optimal monetary and ﬁscal rule combination features passive
ﬁscal and active monetary policy as opposed to active ﬁscal and passive monetary policy is
the following. Recall that this is an economy in which the government has access to lump-
sum taxation. Thus, strategies to ensure ﬁscal solvency that involve the use of lump-sum
taxes should be non-distorting. Under passive ﬁscal policy this is exactly what happens. If
government liabilities are, say, above their target level, then lump-sum taxes are increased
and with time government liabilities return to their long-run level. A rather diﬀerent strategy
for bringing about ﬁscal solvency is to use unexpected variations in the price level as a lump-
sum tax/subsidy on nominal asset holdings of private households. This is what happens
under active ﬁscal policy. For example, consider the simple case in which γ1 = 0, so that
primary ﬁscal deﬁcits are exogenous, and monetary policy is passive pegging the nominal
interest rate. The only way in which ﬁscal solvency of the government can be brought
about in this case is through variations in the real value of government liabilities, which
in turn require appropriate adjustments in the price level. However, in the economy under
34study unexpected movements in the price level increase the distortions stemming from the
presence of nominal rigidities. This is why this strategy of reigning in government ﬁnances
is distorting. For these reasons, from a qualitative point of view, optimal policy is one in
which the non-distorting rather than the distorting ﬁscal instrument is chosen.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that under inﬂation targeting for an equilibrium to exist and be
locally unique ﬁscal policy must be passive, that is, γ1 ∈ [.1,1.9]. This is because under
inﬂation targeting variations in the price level are unavailable as ﬁscal instruments. Again,
for any passive ﬁscal policy the real allocation is the same. As in the previous sections, under
inﬂation targeting the level of welfare is marginally higher than under the optimized rule.
Under a simple Taylor rule that responds only to inﬂation (with a coeﬃcient of 1.5) optimal
ﬁscal policy is passive with γ1 ∈ [.1,1.9]. Welfare under the simple Taylor rule is slightly
below the level of welfare associated with the constrained optimal rule. But the diﬀerence is
small. A decrease of a mere 0.0023 percent in the optimal consumption stream leaves agents
with the same utility than under the Taylor rule.
We now turn our attention to the question of how costly it is from a welfare point of view
to follow a rule other than the optimal one. Figure 6 shows that in general variations in απ
and γ1 have little eﬀect of the level of welfare, provided αy is held constant at 0. The ﬁgure
shows with dots the ﬁscal/monetary rule parameter combinations that result in a locally
unique equilibrium. In the positive orthant, we see that equilibrium is determinate only for
combinations of active ﬁscal policy and passive monetary policy or a combination of passive
ﬁscal policy and active monetary policy. Clearly, one requirement for sound policymaking is
that the decision makers agree on a joint monetary-ﬁscal policy that renders the equilibrium
unique. In the absence of any such coordination, the policies fail to have their intended
eﬀects because equilibrium may either not exist or if it exists, it may not be unique. And
as the graph shows there are many parameterizations of policy for which this undesirable
outcome holds.
The ﬁgure also conveys the idea that if a particular policy combination ensures deter-
minacy, it is likely that it yields almost the same level of welfare as that associated with
the optimized policy rule. Speciﬁcally, ﬁgure 6 shows with a circle values for the feedback
parameter απ and the ﬁscal rule parameter γ1 such that the welfare cost of that policy is at
most 0.05 percent. Most of the parameter speciﬁcations for which the equilibrium is unique
have a circle attached to them, indicating that agents are only marginally better oﬀ under
the optimized rule.
Also, note that there exist parameter constellations that imply welfare costs below ﬁve
one-hundreds of one percent of the optimal consumption stream and feature an active ﬁscal
policy. In particular, for a pure interest rate peg, απ = 0, and γ1 values between 2 and 3
35Figure 6: Determinacy Regions and Welfare in the Model with a Fiscal Feedback Rule for
Lump-Sum Taxes (τL
t = γ0 + γ1(`t−1 − `∗))














Note: A dot represents a policy parameterization for which the equilibrium is
locally unique. A circle indicates that the welfare cost relative to the optimized
policy is less than 5 one-hundredth of one percent. A cross with a circle indicates
that the welfare cost relative to the optimized policy is less than 1 one-thousands
of one percent.
36this is the case. Given our previous discussion of the intuition for why passive ﬁscal policy is
optimal, this result is somewhat surprising. But here is exactly where the contribution of our
paper lies. We ask quantitatively how harmful are policies other than the optimal one. And
our quantitative results show that even if in equilibrium ﬁscal policy is active and hence price
level variations are used to some extend to bring about ﬁscal solvency, despite the fact that
this could be done less costly with lump-sum taxes, we ﬁnd the welfare diﬀerences are small
as long as there is some response in lump-sum taxes to deviations of government liabilities
from target, that is, as long as γ1 6= 0. We conclude from this analysis that the exact setting
of policy parameters, other than αy, matters only insofar as it guarantees determinacy of
equilibrium provided that there is some response of taxes to the level of government liabilities,
that is, provided, γ1 6= 0. About the same level of welfare can be achieved with a combination
of active ﬁscal policy and passive monetary policy as with passive ﬁscal and active monetary
policy.
The previous analysis was conducted under the assumption that αy = 0, as prescribed
by the optimized policy rule. In ﬁgure 7 we consider the welfare consequences of varying αy
between -3 and +3 holding απ and γ1 at their optimized values of 3 and 1.9 (or any other
value implying a passive ﬁscal policy), respectively. The ﬁgure also considers variations in
απ and γ1 for comparison. Variations in αy are shown with the symbol x. Clearly, for αy =0
the welfare cost is zero, since this corresponds to the optimized rule. For values of αy < −0.2,
we ﬁnd that no locally unique equilibrium exists. The graph indicates that the welfare cost
have a minimum at αy = 0, as it should be. For positive values of αy we found equilibrium to
exist. Welfare is highly sensitive to the value of αy. These ﬁndings are consistent with those
obtained for the previous models and reinforce the conclusion that conditioning monetary
policy on the level of economic activity can potentially lead to signiﬁcant welfare losses.
An obvious question is why is responding to output so costly in terms of welfare, in
particular, in light of the fact, that deviating from the optimal rule by making ﬁscal policy
active turns out to be of limited welfare consequences. While at this point, we do not
understand this point as fully as we would like to the following observations may be somewhat
clarifying. Under active ﬁscal policy, there are potentially large surprises in the price level
in response to innovations in the government’s budget constraint. However, and this point
is, we believe, important, the path of expected inﬂation should not be much aﬀected by the
fact that ﬁscal policy is active as opposed to Ricardian. As a result, there should be high
inﬂation volatility at very high frequencies but not much diﬀerence in the inﬂation volatility
at lower frequencies. This could in principle translate into the unconditional variance of
inﬂation being not much higher under active ﬁscal policy than under Ricardian. Figure 8
shows the standard deviation of inﬂation (expressed in percent per year) for all 61 values of
37Figure 7: The Importance of Not Responding to Output in the Model with the Lump-sum
Tax Feedback Rule: τL
t = γ0 + γ1(`t−1 − `∗)

































Note: See note to ﬁgure 2.
38Figure 8: The Standard Deviation of Inﬂation (in percent per year) in the Model with the
Lump-sum Tax Feedback Rule: τL
t = γ0 + γ1(`t−1 − `∗)




























Note: The computation of the variance of inﬂation assumes that αy = 0. Num-
bers shown are based on a ﬁrst-order approximation to the policy function, which
results in a second-order accurate approximation of the variance of inﬂation.
39Figure 9: The Relation between the Standard Deviation of Inﬂation (in percent per year)
and αy in the Model with the Lump-sum Tax Feedback Rule

















































Note: Graph is truncated at a 5.5 percent standard deviation.
γ1 and απ considered in our analysis, holding αy constant at zero. At the constrained optimal
rule, we have that the standard deviation of inﬂation is between one and two tenth of one
percent. Under a active ﬁscal policy, for example, one consisting of a pure interest rate peg
(απ = 0) and an active ﬁscal feedback rule (γ1 =2 .1), the standard deviation of inﬂation lies
between 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points.14 We view these diﬀerences in standard deviation
as economically small. Figure 9 shows the standard deviation of inﬂation for various values
of αy holding απ and γ1 constant at their optimal values. The ﬁgure is truncated at a 5.5
percent standard deviation to keep the scale comparable to the numbers shown in ﬁgure 8.15
At αy = 0, the standard deviation reaches the minimum standard deviation of 0.1042 and
14The exact diﬀerence is 0.2217-0.1042=0.1176.
15The standard deviation keeps rising at an accelerating speed until it reaches about 25 percent at αy =2 ,
the higher value of αy for which a unique equilibrium exists.
40then rises steeply. For example, at αy =0 .5 the standard deviation of inﬂation is already
1.7 percent. One reason why an interest rate feedback rule with a non-zero coeﬃcient on
output leads to such a rapid rise in inﬂation volatility is that for such a policy inﬂation and
the nominal interest rate remain for a long period away from their target value. The idea of
an active monetary policy rule roughly speaking is to set the coeﬃcient on inﬂation so high
that any inﬂation value other than its long-run level would give rise to an explosive path
for inﬂation. In this way an active policy forces inﬂation to return to its target fast and
results in low inﬂation volatility, so that there is an inverse relation between απ and inﬂation
volatility. However, the same type of relationship does not exist between αy and inﬂation
volatility. On the contrary, a high output feedback coeﬃcient in our model is associated
with a large inﬂation volatility. This is because a large value of αy does not necessarily
force inﬂation to explode if it is above target and thus does not force the equilibrium to be
such that inﬂation is back at target almost immediately. In fact, large values of αy lead to
highly persistent (and non-explosive) deviations of inﬂation from target. Those persistent
deviations then show up in high inﬂation volatility.
6.1 Distortionary Taxation
In this economy, we searched over the three policy parameters απ, αy and τ1 in the following







t yt = γ0 + γ1(`t−1 − `).
The numerical results are shown in the bottom panel of table 2. The conditional expectation
of welfare is largest when απ = −3, αy =0 .1, and γ1 = −3. The conditional expectation of
welfare under the optimized monetary and ﬁscal rules is -710.7907.16
The optimal monetary policy rule coeﬃcients are in line with the previous economies
studied in that they are characterized by inﬂation coeﬃcients that are large in absolute
value and an output coeﬃcient that is close to zero. The ﬁscal policy rule coeﬃcient of -3
16Although the focus of our study is not the welfare eﬀects of distortionary taxation, it is worth pointing
out that this level of welfare is signiﬁcantly below that associated with economies in which the ﬁscal authority
has access to lump-sum taxes. The steady-state level of welfare is -710.7351 whereas in the economy with
lump-sum taxes it is -629.7040. For an agent to be indiﬀerent between living in the steady state of the
economy with distorting taxes and the one with lump-sum taxes (not taking into account the transition), he
must be forced to give up 10 percent of the steady-state consumption that he enjoys in the lump-sum tax
world.
41Figure 10: Determinacy Regions and Welfare in the Model with Distorting Taxes (τD
t yt =
γ0 + τ1(`t−1 − `))














Note: See note to ﬁgure 1.
indicates that in response to positive deviations of total government liabilities from their
long-run level total tax revenues fall signiﬁcantly. A striking feature of the optimized policy
is the negative sign of the inﬂation coeﬃcient in the interest-rate feedback rule. Another
noteworthy characteristic of the best rule is the fact that απ is greater than unity in absolute
value and that γ1 is negative. In simpler theoretical structures (such as Leeper, 1991) such
a parameter combination would preclude the existence of a stationary rational expectations
equilibrium.
However, more standard policy parameters deliver welfare levels that are not much dif-
ferent from the that associated with the optimized policy. Figure 10 shows that as long as
the output coeﬃcient, αy, is held constant at 0.1, many combinations of απ and γ1 result
in welfare diﬀerences relative to the best rule of at most 0.05 percent of consumption. In
42particular, there exist many combinations of monetary policy with απ > 1 and ﬁscal policy
with small and positive values for γ1 (which are more in line with the type of policy rules
typically studied in the related literature) that provide about the same level of welfare as
the optimized rule.
As with the other models, we could not compute the level of welfare associated with a
standard Taylor rule. The reason is that for this parameter conﬁgurations the equilibrium
is too close to a bifurcation point for our numerical approximation technique to produce a
reliable answer. We were able, though, to approximate the level of welfare associated with
a simple Taylor rule (απ =1 .5 and αy = 0). In this case it is optimal to set γ1 =0 .1. The
resulting level of welfare is marginally below the optimum at -710.7978 implying a welfare
cost of 0.0009 percent of consumption. A magnitude that we regard as negligible. Inﬂation
targeting continues to be a good policy, it slightly dominates the optimized rule yielding
welfare gains of 0.0043 percent of consumption.
As in the economies with lump-sum taxes, we ﬁnd that interest rate rules featuring a
large output coeﬃcient can be disruptive from a welfare point of view (Figure 11). Values of
απ close to but below unity can also result in welfare levels signiﬁcantly below that associated
with the optimal rule.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we evaluate the stabilizing properties of simple monetary and ﬁscal rules. Our
measure of stabilization is given by the level of welfare of private agents. By simple rules
we mean ones where policy variables such as the nominal interest rates, and tax rates are
set as a function of a few number of observable aggregates such as output, inﬂation, and
government debt. We further restrict our rules to be implementable by requiring that they
be associated with a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
Within the class of simple and implementable rules, we ﬁnd that: ﬁrst, welfare is virtually
insensitive to changes in the inﬂation coeﬃcient in the interest-rate feedback rule. Second,
interest-rate feedback rules that respond to output can be signiﬁcantly harmful. Third,
whether the ﬁscal stance is passive or active has little eﬀect on welfare.
The theoretical model nd methodology we employ improves upon the existing literature
by including simultaneously all of the following elements: (a) sluggish price adjustment;
(b) capital accumulation; (c) no subsidies aimed at eliminating the long-run distortions
introduced by imperfect competition; (d) positive long-run inﬂation. (e) Welfare evaluation
using a second-order accurate solution to the equilibrium behavior of endogenous variables.
(f) Policy is evaluated using a measure of welfare conditional on the initial state of the
43Figure 11: The Importance of Not Responding to Output in the Model with Distortionary
Taxation (τD
t yt = γ0 + τ1(`t−1 − `))





































Note: See note to ﬁgure 2.
44economy (as opposed to unconditional measures of welfare, which ignore transitional eﬀects
associated with policy changes).
But the model studied in this paper leaves out a number of features that have been
identiﬁed as potentially important for understanding business ﬂuctuations. Christiano et
al. (2003), for instance, argue that nominal wage stickiness, and real frictions such as
habit formation, capital adjustment costs, and variable capacity utilization are important
in improving the ability of models like the one we study to explain U.S. business cycles. In
work in progress (Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2003) we take up the task of identifying optimal
simple and implementable rules in the context of a larger but more realistic model of the
U.S. business cycle.
45Appendix A: Derivation of φit, equation (16)
Firms in our model can hold money, Mt, and bonds B
f
t . Total wealth of the ﬁrm, Wt evolves
over time according to the following law of motion
Wt+1 = Rt [Pitait − Ptutkit − Ptwthit]+Mt + RtBt
Wealth will then be used to buy bonds and money, that is,
Wt+1 = Mt+1 + Bt+1
Rewriting the evolution of ﬁrm wealth we then have:
Wt+1 = Rt [Pitait − Ptutkit − Ptwthit]+RtWt + Mt(1 − Rt)
= Rt
￿










So the change in the present value of wealth of the ﬁrm from one period to the next is:
Wt+1
Rt
− Wt = Pitait − Ptutkit − Ptwthit − Mt(1 − R
−1
t )




− Wt = Pitait − Ptutkit − Ptwthit − Mt(1 − R
−1
t ),
which is equation (16).
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